• The goal is for the Constitutional Court to truly defend the Constitution and your rights, rather than anyone’s personal interests. Today, its work largely depends on the political will of the President, transparency is weak, and the path for an ordinary Belarusian to constitutional protection is confusing and unreliable. In practice, this means that even if your rights are violated, obtaining a fair ruling is almost impossible.

• The new law fixes this. It strengthens collegiality and transparency, introduces clear procedures and deadlines, makes decisions transparent and reasoned, and ensures the Court is organizationally and financially independent. The idea is simple: the Constitutional Court operates under clear rules, maintains equal distance from all branches of power, and prioritizes the supremacy of the Constitution and protection of human rights.

• Under the draft, the Court’s structure changes: there will be 15 judges instead of 12; they will be appointed once for a 9-year term without reappointment; every three years, one-third of the Court is renewed — this built-in rotation maintains continuity while preventing the Court from being “reset” under a single political force.

• The procedure also introduces competition and balance. Candidates are first selected through an open contest, then three separate authorities submit nominations — President, Chair of the Sojm, and Chair of the Supreme Court — with at least two candidates per vacancy. The Sojm makes the final decision by secret ballot with a majority of the full constitutional composition. This prevents control by one political force and ensures the Court’s independence and stability.

• By contrast, currently, there are 12 judges, serving 11-year terms with the possibility of reappointment, elected by the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly under the President’s control. This creates dependence on those who decide on extending terms. The draft removes this dependence.

• The draft Constitution expands access to constitutional justice, including individual constitutional complaints by citizens. This will significantly increase case flow and requires stable collegial work, with the ability to divide cases into chambers and bring the most complex cases to the plenary Court. Therefore, the number of judges is increased to 15 from the current 12, making the Court more efficient, diverse in expertise, less dependent on any single strong figure, and capable of issuing more balanced rulings.

• There is also an organizational reason: with a larger Court, it is easier to form stable panels of five judges while maintaining a quorum for plenary sessions. As a result, the Court will manage the increased workload while upholding high standards of quality.

• Rotation is the planned partial renewal of the Constitutional Court at regular intervals. The Court is not replaced all at once; every three years, one-third of the judges are renewed. To start the cycle, the first appointments are for varying terms — three, six, and nine years — determined by lottery. Subsequently, judges leave at the end of their terms, and rotation occurs automatically.

• This is needed for stability and independence. Gradual renewal preserves institutional memory, protects the Court from sudden political shifts, and provides predictability and public trust: there is always a mix of experience and fresh perspective, not just a team aligned with the current authorities.

• Yes. The draft law explicitly gives every citizen the right to approach the Constitutional Court if they believe their constitutional rights have been violated. Complaints can be submitted directly after exhausting ordinary courts and standard appeals.

• Currently, only a “partial” complaint is allowed: the Court reviews only the law applied in the case. The draft introduces a full constitutional complaint, allowing challenges to any violation of constitutional rights once other remedies are exhausted. Requirements for form and evidence are clearly defined to make the procedure accessible and understandable.

• To prevent the influence of a single political force, the draft establishes a multi-stage procedure for forming the Constitutional Court. Candidates are selected through an open competition. Then three different authorities — President, Chair of the Sojm, and Chair of the Supreme Court — submit their proposals to parliament, with at least two candidates per vacancy. The final decision is made by the Sojm with a majority of the full composition. Judges serve a single nine-year term without reappointment, with one-third renewed every three years. This prevents assembling a “friendly” Court for a single team.

• Further protective mechanisms include separate approval of the Court’s budget, which cannot be reduced without its consent, and clear rules preventing dismissal of a judge for “undesirable” decisions. Together, these measures make the Court independent from external directives — from candidate selection and voting to funding and status guarantees. The Court is accountable only to the Constitution and citizens.

• Previously issued decisions remain valid and binding to avoid a legal vacuum. The reform changes rules for the future — Court composition, procedures, citizen access — but does not automatically annul past rulings.

• If significant grounds arise to review legal positions, this will be done through a clear procedure by the new Court, with publicly stated reasoning. In other words, the country will gain an updated, independent Court while maintaining legal certainty.

• An organic law is a law that translates constitutional norms into clear, everyday rules. The Constitution sets the framework, and the organic law gives it concrete content.

• The Draft Constitution specifies that the Sojm adopts three types of laws: constitutional, organic, and ordinary, each with its own threshold for adoption.

• An ordinary law is passed by a simple majority of those participating in the vote, but at least one-third of the constitutional composition of parliament.

• An organic law requires a majority of the full constitutional composition of the Sojm, making it harder to pass but easier to protect from situational changes.

• A constitutional law has the highest barrier: it is approved in the third reading by three-fifths of the constitutional composition, and amendments to the main sections additionally require a referendum.

• Essentially, the deeper a law interferes with the structure of power, the broader the consensus required for its adoption. This ensures the predictability and stability of the rules that affect every Belarusian.

You can discuss the draft and propose amendments on several open platforms:

• on the website https://prastora.info

• in the SVAE mobile app (in the “Belarus Constitution Project” community)

• and on the Try Slany platform http://tryslany.com

On each platform, you can leave a comment on a specific article or provide general feedback — anonymously or under your name. All platforms protect personal data. Proposals collected from these resources are regularly gathered and forwarded to the Working Group for consideration.