Today’s Prosecutor’s Office in Belarus has become part of the repressive system rather than a guardian of the rule of law. It was supposed to prevent unlawful detentions, torture, fabricated criminal cases, pressure on lawyers, and politically motivated convictions. In practice, however, it often either supported these practices or turned a blind eye to them.

After a democratic transition, it will not be enough to leave this institution unchanged and expect it to function differently. The Prosecutor’s Office will play a key role in releasing and rehabilitating those affected by repression, reviewing unlawful convictions, investigating crimes committed by the regime, and protecting people from abuses by law enforcement agencies. Without fundamental reform, the old logic of political persecution could persist even under a new government.

That is why a new law is needed — to ensure that the Prosecutor’s Office is no longer an instrument of political control. It should become an institution that serves the law, protects human rights, and helps restore public trust in the state.

Under the current law, the Prosecutor’s Office is organized as a single, highly centralized body with broad supervisory powers. It oversees compliance with legislation across nearly all areas of public life, coordinates law enforcement agencies, participates in court proceedings, supervises investigations, and monitors the execution of sentences. This model gives the Prosecutor’s Office exceptionally broad authority within the state.

The draft law narrows its role, focusing on criminal prosecution, procedural supervision of investigations, representing the prosecution in court, overseeing the legality of investigations, operational-search activities, and detention facilities. In other words, the emphasis shifts away from broad oversight of society and the state toward ensuring fair criminal justice and protecting human rights where the risk of abuse is greatest.

The key difference is that the draft moves the Prosecutor’s Office away from being a universal supervisory body and part of a rigid power vertical. Instead, it envisions a prosecution service that operates within the criminal justice system, acts in accordance with the law, does not serve political interests, and is responsible for safeguarding human rights.

International practice does not prescribe a single model of prosecution service for all countries. Prosecutors’ powers vary from one jurisdiction to another. However, the common democratic standard is that the Prosecutor’s Office should primarily be part of the criminal justice system: directing criminal investigations, representing the prosecution in court, supervising the legality of investigations, and protecting the rights of participants in criminal proceedings.

The current law in Belarus retains a broader model inherited from the Soviet system. Under this model, the Prosecutor’s Office acts not only as a participant in criminal justice but also as a body exercising general oversight over compliance with legislation across almost every sphere. This gives prosecutors extensive influence over state institutions, organizations, public officials, and citizens, creating the risk of encroaching on the roles of the courts, the ombudsperson, and other institutions responsible for protecting rights.

The draft law is much closer to the modern European approach. It concentrates the Prosecutor’s Office’s responsibilities where they are genuinely needed: criminal prosecution, procedural supervision of investigations, representing the prosecution in court, overseeing investigations, operational-search activities, and places of detention. In other words, the Prosecutor’s Office ceases to function as a universal supervisor of the entire state and instead becomes a specialized institution dedicated to ensuring fair criminal justice.

This is particularly important for Belarus in light of its experience with political repression. International standards require prosecutors to be independent, impartial, politically neutral, and guided by the law rather than the interests of those in power. Accordingly, the draft law does more than redefine prosecutorial powers — it proposes an entirely different philosophy of prosecution: less general oversight of society and greater responsibility for ensuring lawful investigations, protecting human rights, and upholding the right to a fair trial.

Under the current law, the appointment of prosecutors is organized as part of a strict hierarchical chain of command. Key decisions are made from the top down: the Prosecutor General is appointed by the President with the consent of the Council of the Republic; the Prosecutor General appoints a significant number of senior prosecutors and managers; and appointments at lower levels are made through the chain of subordinate prosecutors. For ordinary citizens, this process remains opaque, as it is unclear who enters the prosecution service, according to what criteria, how their integrity is assessed, or whether the selection process can be scrutinized.

The draft law introduces a different approach. The appointment process begins with an open recruitment procedure. Candidates must meet the established eligibility requirements, submit the necessary documents, pass a qualifying examination, undergo a special background check, complete an interview, demonstrate their professional and ethical qualifications, be included in a personnel reserve, complete training, and only then compete for a specific position.

A key innovation is the introduction of the Sojm (Assembly) of Prosecutors, a body of prosecutorial self-governance, into the selection process. Rather than merely formalizing someone else’s decision, it organizes competitive recruitment, evaluates candidates, considers their ranking, verifies their integrity, and submits recommendations for appointment. In addition, civil society organizations and citizens may provide information regarding a candidate’s integrity, while decisions refusing admission to the personnel reserve may be appealed in court.

The purpose of these reforms is to ensure that the appointment of prosecutors is no longer a closed process controlled by the administrative hierarchy. Instead, the draft law makes it more transparent, merit-based, and accountable. Prosecutors should enter the profession not through personal loyalty, but through open competition, professional competence, a strong reputation, and a demonstrated commitment to upholding the law.

The draft law defines prosecutorial self-governance as the collective management of matters related to the functioning of the prosecution service. It establishes prosecutors’ meetings, the Assembly of Prosecutors, and the Sojm of Prosecutors. These bodies are responsible for issues such as personnel selection, professional ethics, disciplinary proceedings, safeguarding prosecutorial independence, workload management, professional training, and the organization of the prosecution service. This creates an internal counterbalance to the rigid hierarchical system in which all decisions depend on instructions from above.

For citizens, this matters because a prosecutor who lacks independence cannot reliably uphold the rule of law. If prosecutors fear their superiors or political authorities, they are more likely to follow orders than to stop unlawful prosecutions, torture, fabricated cases, or pressure on witnesses. Self-governance is intended to ensure that prosecutors rely not on personal loyalty to their superiors, but on the law, professional standards, and the support of an independent prosecutorial community.

At the same time, self-governance does not mean creating a closed professional corporation beyond public oversight. On the contrary, the draft law links it to competitive recruitment, integrity screening, disciplinary procedures, transparency of decisions, and the possibility of judicial review. The purpose of prosecutorial self-governance is to make the prosecution service more independent from political power while also making it more accountable to the law and to society.