Executive summary. In the first half of 2026, Russia continued to expand its ‘soft power’ infrastructure in Belarus: its network of diplomatic missions, institutions of the Russkiy Mir Foundation and affiliated organisations. The most active areas were the promotion of Russian ideological discourse, work with young people, and influence over historical memory. The activities of Rossotrudnichestvo were particularly visible, combining educational and cultural programmes with propaganda in support of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the justification of the annexation of Ukrainian territories. Other structures — the Moscow House, the Russian Military Historical Society and the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund — focused on patriotic education, memorial policy and work with compatriots.
Expansion of the network of diplomatic missions. In February 2026, the expansion of the Russian Federation’s network of diplomatic missions in Belarus was announced. This concerns the opening of branches of the Russian embassy in Vitebsk, Mogilev and Gomel. Apart from Belarus, Russia has no comparable diplomatic units anywhere in the world. In addition to them, Russian consulates general operate in Brest and Grodno. Russia has a similar density of diplomatic representation only in China. The opening of embassy branches is explained by the strengthening of interregional cooperation. It is known that they will not provide consular services. At the same time, the activity of the branch in Vitebsk clearly shows an intention to establish contacts with security structures.
Rossotrudnichestvo offices are the most extensive network of institutions promoting the ideology of the ‘Russian World’ in Belarus. It includes four so-called ‘Russian Houses’ in Minsk, Gomel, Brest and Grodno, as well as the All About Russia information and cultural centre in Mogilev. The density of the network in Belarus has no equivalent anywhere in the world. Usually, one or two offices of this organisation are opened in a foreign country. The number of Rossotrudnichestvo offices in Belarus is greater than in Kazakhstan and India (four in each country). The network’s expansion falls in the period after 2020, when offices were opened in Brest, Grodno and Mogilev. It is known that the latter is a joint project of Rossotrudnichestvo and the Republican Scientific and Technical Library, opened at the library’s Mogilev branch.
The Russian House in Minsk has 2,300 Telegram subscribers, with an average of around 300 views per post; in Gomel the figures are 1,300 and 350 respectively, in Brest 560 and 150, and in Grodno 540 and 200. It is known that the Gomel house employs up to 10 staff.
The ‘Russian Houses’ in Belarus have a broad network of partner organisations. Among those mentioned are the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, which is close to the Lukashenko administration and the KGB, the Belaya Rus party, its youth wing Iskra, the BRSM, city and regional executive committees, and the Ark cultural centre of St Elisabeth Convent in Minsk. Cadets of the Minsk Suvorov Military School and cadet schools, as well as members of military-patriotic clubs, are visible among attendees of events.
Officially, Rossotrudnichestvo offices organise competitions for study at Russian universities, support compatriots abroad and promote the Russian language and culture worldwide. Study scholarships cover tuition fees, accommodation and travel to the place of study. In recent years, up to 1,300 places have been allocated for Belarus. Rossotrudnichestvo conducts its own competition for these places. Participants must successfully pass remote examinations in two of the six subjects offered. Statistics show that this year the largest number of applicants took the Russian-language examination — 549 people, of whom 477 achieved passing scores. In other words, this is significantly fewer than the number of places offered.
A certain share of activities consists of events supporting the Russian language and culture.
However, it is precisely the Rossotrudnichestvo offices that stand out for the particularly aggressive promotion of ideological discourse, above all in the form of open propaganda in support of the aggression against Ukraine. For this purpose, screenings were widely used of the documentary films ‘Call Sign Bukhanka’, ‘Donbas: The Road to Peace’, ‘Quiet Rear’, ‘Cultural Front’, including films produced by Belarusian official media: ‘Aidar. A 21st-Century Concentration Camp’.
Film screenings are often accompanied by meetings with actual participants in the aggression against Ukraine. For example, in Grodno, a meeting was held with Yuri Zotov, who shared ‘his personal experience of participating in the SVO’. Such events are accompanied by banners reading ‘From the Grodno Region — to SVO fighters’, the making of postcards ‘for SVO fighters’ with an invitation to residents ‘to leave New Year and Christmas wishes for SVO fighters on them’, the collection of parcels for Defender of the Fatherland Day — in reality, for participants in the aggression against Ukraine — and calls to send them ‘small postcards or letters with warm words of gratitude, made by hand’.
Support for the SVO is regularly mentioned at meetings of historical clubs at the Russian Houses in Minsk and Gomel ‘in the context of generational сontinuity and the defence of historical truth’.
Closely linked to the theme of rehabilitating the aggression against Ukraine is the narrative justifying the annexation of territories of the Ukrainian state. For this purpose, calendar dates are marked as supposed reunifications, declarations of independence, and so on. Examples include the Day of the Proclamation of the Donetsk Republic, the 12th anniversary of the seizure of Crimea, a date linked to the 1991 referendum in which the majority of Crimeans supported the restoration of Crimean autonomy, and others.
In addition to specific events and activities, a tool for influencing the sphere of historical memory is a calendar of dates focused on military history, above all the Second World War. Numerous festivals, competitions, quizzes, online flash mobs and other activities are tied to it. One example is the ‘Soviet-Style Patriotic Poster’ competition, whose theme was ‘The Feat of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War’.
The Russian Houses actively supported the holding of Immortal Regiment marches, for which official permission had previously not been granted in Belarus. On 9 May this year, such actions were held in the capital and in all regional centres except Gomel.
Rossotrudnichestvo’s activity causes at least irritation on the part of the Lukashenko regime. Indirect evidence of this is a post by the head of the Russian House in Gomel, Alexander Marzhukhin, in which he complains of ‘not always understandable and unconstructive attitudes towards our activities on the part of some organisations and institutions’ and recalls that his institution ‘operates legitimately and within the legal framework’. It is known that Lukashenko previously spoke critically about Rossotrudnichestvo’s activities in Belarus, stating that ‘Belarusians do not need to be agitated in favour of Russia’.
The network of institutions of the Russkiy Mir Foundation includes several so-called rooms and sections at Brest State University, the Mogilev Regional Library, Vitebsk Orthodox Theological Seminary and Secondary School No. 3 in Miory. On 24 May, the Cabinet of Russian Linguaculture (Russkiy Mir Cabinet) was opened at Francisk Skorina Gomel State University.
Unlike Rossotrudnichestvo institutions, Russkiy Mir offices are more focused on promoting Russian literature and culture. Historical topics are represented mainly by a calendar of commemorative dates connected with the Second World War. Examples include a literary hour dedicated to front-line writers in Brest, the patriotic game ‘1941–1945. We Remember’, the literary-patriotic composition ‘Lyrics of the Front-Line Generation’ in Mogilev, and others.
The activity of the Moscow House in Minsk largely duplicates the events of Rossotrudnichestvo offices. Officially, its main aim is to support Russian compatriots, strengthen good-neighbourly relations between Moscow and Minsk, and form a positive image of the Moscow government in the Republic of Belarus. Festivals, concerts, exhibitions, forums and master classes are held there. Social activities are carried out to support and develop the Russian language and culture. Participation in the patriotic education of young people in Belarus is emphasised.
The Moscow House Telegram channel has 765 subscribers. In addition to organisations of Russian compatriots, the partners of the Moscow House include the Belarusian Union of Officers, the Belarusian Union of Naval Servicemen and the Belarusian Union of Veterans of the War in Afghanistan.
In addition to events connected with Russian literature and theatre culture, the Moscow House engages in systematic propaganda whose content coincides with the ideology of the ‘Russian World’. This is a combination of Soviet, imperial, monarchist and Orthodox agendas, with a particular focus on military history, above all the Second World War. The calendar of commemorative dates in the first half of 2026 includes the birthday of Alexander III, the day on which Russian was introduced as a compulsory subject in the USSR, Submariner’s Day, and so on.
The Moscow House participates in drawing Belarusian youth into the orbit of ‘Russian World’ events, including competitive selection for the international session ‘Bridge of Friendship: Russia and the World’ at Artek in Crimea, as well as numerous competitions connected with Victory Day (the children’s drawing competition ‘We Draw Victory’, and the poetry and song competition ‘The Link Between Generations: Lines of Victory’, with the categories ‘Poetic Voice of Victory’, ‘Melody of Victory’ and ‘Inspiration of Victory: Original Works’).
In the first half of 2026, the Moscow House hosted the round table ‘Dialogue of Compatriots. Current Issues and Interaction’, as well as a conference of compatriots from the near abroad.
The Russian Military Historical Society is one of the most active Russian actors in the Belarusian space. The Society does not have a representative office in Belarus with legal-entity status, but it does have an official representative — Vadim Lakiza, who is also director of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. The Society’s main partner is the Centre for Military History of Belarus of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.
The RMHS is known in Belarus for promoting a campaign to install monuments to figures connected with Russian imperial and Soviet military history. In 2025, a monument to Konstantin Rokossovsky and a worship cross to soldiers of the Russian Imperial Army who died during the First World War were installed. The opening of a monument to Ivan Paskevich has been planned and agreed for 2026. More distant plans include monuments to Lieutenant General of Aviation Yakov Smushkevich, military intelligence officer Lieutenant General Alexander Trusov, Lieutenant General Daniil Kazakevich, intelligence officer Naum Eitingon, as well as the restoration of the historical image of Count Nikolai Rumyantsev in Gomel.
The Joint Russian-Belarusian Commission on History is connected with the Society’s activities. The working and expert instrument of this commission is the Expert Advisory Russian-Belarusian Council on History (EAC). Analysis of the Council’s website indicates that its activity is not very intensive. News is updated, but is general in nature — such as congratulations on Victory Day or the Day of Unity of the Peoples of Belarus and Russia. The publication plan for 2024–2025, which included the publication of textbooks on the history of the Union State, Belarusian studies and Russian studies, was not implemented.
The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund is active in Belarus through project funding, educational programmes, research internships in Russia and the work of its partner Centre for Eurasian Communication in Minsk. This is one of the Fund’s two foreign representative offices.
It promotes youth initiatives and prepares analytical materials on the Union State. Its activities include organising conferences, business meetings, cultural and educational programmes, as well as work with government bodies, international organisations and research structures in CIS countries. In the first half of 2026, the Centre’s partners included the Russian International Affairs Council, the BRSM, the Znanie society, the branch of the Russian State Social University and the MITSO University.
The Centre’s activities in the first half of the year included training for NGOs, a discussion on creating a textbook on the history of the Union State for universities, the video conference ‘Problems of Eurasian Integration and the Development of the Union State in the Academic and Educational Discourse of Belarus and Russia’, and so on. The Centre’s public rhetoric is less closely connected with the ideology of the ‘Russian World’; however, the Centre promotes ‘Eurasian cultural codes’ and ‘Slavic values’ as opposed to Western models of behaviour.
Conclusions. In the first half of 2026, the presence of Russian ‘soft power’ institutions in Belarus remained extensive and continued to expand. The unprecedented increase in the density of ‘soft power’ institutions, which has no equivalent anywhere in the world, is noteworthy. Given the dominance of the Russian language in the public space of the Republic of Belarus, the evident redundancy of ‘soft power’ structures indicates that they serve a purpose different from the one officially declared. The most extensive and ideologically active network was formed by Rossotrudnichestvo, which combined cultural and educational programmes with the promotion of Russian military-political narratives. Other structures concentrated on work with young people and compatriots, influence over historical memory, memorial policy and the popularisation of integration within the Union State. Taken together, this indicates the systemic nature of Russian humanitarian and ideological influence, exercised through state, educational, cultural and public channels.
The monitoring was prepared by Dr. Pavel Tserashkovich, Advisor on Education and Science to the President-elect of Belarus Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
