• An independent anti-corruption body is needed to ensure that the fight against corruption is systematic rather than selective.

• Corruption does not arise only where a bribe has already been taken — it starts earlier, where there are no transparent rules, no oversight of conflicts of interest, no verification of asset declarations, and no clear standards for public officials.

• Therefore, such a body should both investigate violations and proactively close vulnerabilities within the system itself.

• Its independence is not meant to remove accountability, but rather to enable it to scrutinize those in power without political pressure, while remaining accountable to parliament and society.

• The main difference lies in its logic of operation. The current system largely reacts to violations after they occur, whereas the proposed model combines in a single body the investigation of serious corruption, risk prevention, and the enforcement of ethical standards. In other words, it should both punish and eliminate the conditions that allow corruption to arise.

• The second difference is independence. Existing bodies are embedded within the standard power hierarchy, while the proposal envisions a separate institution with special guarantees, enabling it to address corruption even at the highest levels.

• Third, it establishes a single center of responsibility. Instead of “different agencies handling parts of the problem,” one body will oversee the entire cycle: receiving reports, investigating, identifying systemic gaps, and ensuring that rules are changed accordingly.

• No. It is designed as a specialized body focusing on serious and systemic corruption, primarily at the highest levels, where decisions affect the distribution of resources, large financial flows, and personnel policies. Routine cases and mass offenses will remain within the remit of existing law enforcement agencies.

• The Committee is designed not only to investigate major cases but also to shape everyday rules and practices.

• First, through clear standards of conduct: what is allowed and what is not, how to manage conflicts of interest, how to handle gifts, secondary employment, or transitions to the private sector. This reduces grey areas where many decisions are currently made informally.

• Second, through oversight of procedures. The Committee will review how decisions are made — procurement, appointments, allocation of resources — and identify areas where the system itself creates opportunities for corruption, then propose changes.

• Third, through ongoing oversight and training. This includes anti-corruption review of legislation, work with asset declarations, and training for public officials so that compliance becomes a normal professional practice rather than something driven by fear.

• In essence, the goal is to make integrity not an exception but the standard in everyday public service.

• Currently, declarations are submitted and reviewed within the same institutions where officials work. This reduces both the preventive effect and trust in the process. In the new model, the collection of declarations, maintenance of a unified registry, and verification of information will be transferred to an independent Committee.

• The second difference is the quality of verification. Today’s system does not require mandatory automated cross-checking with state registries of property, vehicles, and corporate ownership. The new model is based on a unified registry, verification of data accuracy, comparison of income and expenses, and lifestyle monitoring. This will make it possible to see both what a person declares and whether it corresponds to reality.

• The third difference is transparency. Currently, public oversight of officials’ income is effectively impossible. The new model provides for a unified registry and the publication of publicly accessible data. In other words, declarations should no longer be a mere internal formality but a real tool for public oversight and corruption prevention.

• Corruption is not only about bribing officials—it also includes hidden influence on politics through money.

• Without oversight of who finances political parties and election campaigns, state decisions may serve private interests rather than the public good.

• The experience of other countries, particularly Latvia, shows that monitoring party financing helps to block channels of hidden influence over resource allocation and personnel decisions.

• That is why this function is assigned to a specialized body on ethics and anti-corruption: to see the connections between party financing, lobbying, conflicts of interest, and corruption in public administration as a single system of risks, rather than a set of isolated problems.

• This risk exists, which is why the draft law includes several safeguards. The Committee is designed to be independent from the standard executive hierarchy.

• Its chair would be selected through an open competition for a fixed term and could not be dismissed at will on political grounds.

• Direct interference in specific inspections and investigations would be prohibited, and funding would be protected by special rules to prevent pressure through budget cuts.

• At the same time, the Committee would not be beyond oversight — it would remain accountable to parliament and society.

• The idea is not to create another powerful body but to protect it both from political pressure and from lack of accountability.

• The draft law emphasizes that individuals should not risk their safety when reporting corruption. It provides for secure reporting channels and — unlike standard laws on citizens’ appeals — allows reports to be submitted anonymously or confidentially.

• All forms of retaliation are explicitly prohibited: dismissal, demotion, threats, or worsening of working conditions.

• If such actions occur, they themselves become violations with consequences for those responsible.

• In cases of real danger, state protection for whistleblowers and their relatives is also provided.

You can discuss the draft and propose amendments on several open platforms:

• on the website https://prastora.info

• and on the Try Slany platform http://tryslany.com

On each platform, you can leave a comment on a specific article or provide general feedback — anonymously or under your name. All platforms protect personal data. Proposals collected from these resources are regularly gathered and forwarded to the Working Group for consideration.